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Justice and fairness related behaviors in non-human primates 
Sarah F. Brosnan 
 
Abstract 
A distinctive feature across human societies is our interest in justice and fairness. People will 
sometimes invest in extremely costly behavior in order to achieve fair outcomes for themselves 
and others. Why do people care so much about justice?  One way to address this is 
comparatively, exploring behaviors related to justice and fairness in other species. In this paper, 
I review work exploring responses to inequity, prosocial behavior, and other relevant behaviors 
in non-human primates in an effort to understand both the potential evolutionary function of 
these behaviors and the social and ecological reasons for the individual differences in behavior. 
I also consider how these behaviors relate to human behavior, particularly in the case of 
experimental studies using games derived from experimental economics to compare non-
human primates’ responses to those of humans in similar experimental conditions. These 
results emphasize the importance of a comparative approach in order to better understand the 
function and diversity of human behavior. 
 
\body 
1. Introduction 
A feature of humans that apparently sets us apart as a species is our focus on others’ well-being 
as well as our own (1-3). We will, sometimes at great personal cost, protest outcomes that we 
consider unfair, whether they personally affect us or have no direct impact on our lives.  What 
is it that causes people to behave in this way?  One possibility is that it is due to culture. In fact, 
only English has a word for the concept of “fairness”; other languages have adopted the English 
word, indicating a culturally broad interest in the concept, but potentially implying that the 
concept is not ubiquitous (4). Another possibility is that we have evolved to be interested in the 
well-being of others. While there are clear fitness benefits to considering one’s own well-being, 
there are also (more delayed) benefits to considering others’ well-being. There may be costs to 
helping others in the short term, but if there are long-term benefits, either due to continued 
interactions based on reciprocity or, more indirectly, due to gaining a reputation as a “fair” 
person, then the behavior can be selected (5). If this behavior has evolved, we may find similar 
behaviors, or precursor behaviors, in other species. Other species will not show these behaviors 
in the same way that humans do. Among other reasons for this, many behaviors related to 
fairness and justice, such as the ability to share information about a third party’s previous 
behavior, require language. Nonetheless, an important question is the degree to which fairness 
and justice have evolved from similar sorts of behaviors in other species. This evolutionary 
approach provides insight into understanding our own behavior. 
In humans, the concept of fairness is closely related to that of justice. Distinguishing the 
two, fairness involves voluntary interactions with other individuals, while justice is meted out 
by an impartial third party (4). Based on these definitions, most of the experimental work 
discussed below relates to fairness, rather than justice, as the subjects being studied are 
involved in the interactions and outcomes in question. Outside of the experimental context, 
observations suggest impartial interventions in others’ interactions, indicating that these 
species may also be sensitive to justice concerns. There are many different aspects of justice 
and fairness, including distributive, procedural, retributive, restorative, etc. Most experimental 
studies involving non-human species measure subjects’ responses to different distributions of 
food rewards, and hence concern distributive justice or fairness. In humans, two common 
distribution mechanisms are egalitarianism, in which all individuals get the same outcome (e.g., 
equality) and equity, in which individuals’ benefits are proportional to their inputs. Both of 
these are amenable to study in other species, and are the feature most commonly manipulated 
in the aforementioned experimental studies (e.g., by altering subjects’ payoffs as compared to 
their partner’s). Outside of the experimental realm, observational studies indicate that non-
human primates are also sensitive to non-distributional aspects of justice and fairness, such as 
judging the appropriateness of another’s behavior, providing a broader context in which to 
consider justice or fairness in these species. 
Studying other species’ behaviors in these situations allows us to elucidate the 
evolutionary function of justice and fairness by exploring behaviors that are related, either 
because the behavior itself is a component of justice or fairness, or because it represents a 
precursor to human behavior. Studying other species is informative in two complementary 
ways, through homology and convergence. Homologies occur when a behavior exists in 
multiple species because the behavior existed in a shared common ancestor. This pinpoints 
when in the taxon’s phylogenetic history the trait evolved. Convergences occur when a 
behavior evolved in multiple species due to common selective pressures, but without shared 
descent from a common ancestor. Convergences may be particularly informative when 
studying the function of a behavior as, through comparison across species, they may indicate 
which traits co-occur and the social or ecological pressures that may have selected for the 
behavior.  
My goal in this review is to bring together data regarding behaviors related to justice 
and fairness in non-human primate species (hereafter, primates). Observations have 
highlighted situations in which primates act as if their behavior is guided by an interest in the 
outcomes of others (6, 7). A decade ago, the first experimental studies emerged, focusing on 
one aspect of justice and fairness: how individuals responded to getting less than a partner (8, 
9). These studies utilized methods derived from game theory and showed that, in experimental 
settings in which inequity between two individuals was introduced, subjects responded 
negatively to inequity not in their favor. Since that time, this task has been extended to 
fourteen species, including ten primate species, allowing for a broad phylogenetic view that 
provides insight into the evolutionary function of inequity (10). Additionally, responses to 
inequity have been explored in more species-specific contexts and situations (11, 12). These 
results highlight the correlation between inequity and cooperation as well as emphasizing the 
socio-ecological factors that influenced the emergence of justice- and fairness-related behavior. 
This comparative analysis is beginning to shed light on the factors that may have led to the 
evolution of justice- and fairness-related behaviors in humans and other primates (13).  
 
2. Justice and fairness related behavior in other species 
One hypothesis for the evolution of fairness is that recognizing inequities helped 
individuals ascertain the value of their partners in cooperative interactions (10, 14). Individuals 
should not continue to work with others if they do not, on average, benefit from the 
relationship. Whether outcomes are equitable may be used as a proxy; if one’s outcomes are 
routinely wanting as compared to one’s partner’s, then it is likely that an interaction with 
another partner, even one chosen at random, will lead to a more beneficial outcome. This leads 
to a partner choice mechanism in which individuals sample other partners when they are 
experiencing high levels of inequity with the current partner or partners (15). Note that 
individuals thus recognize and respond to inequity without any understanding of why they are 
doing so. Additionally, this provides a benefit even if the individual’s outcomes in the less 
advantageous interaction are net positive, as the currency of natural selection is relative, rather 
than absolute, gains.  
 While this hypothesis linking inequity and cooperation emerged in the context of 
humans, other species also cooperate with one another, so behaviors related to inequity may 
occur in other cooperative species as well. Comparative research is challenging. First, the 
manifestations of justice and fairness may be different in different species, making it difficult 
for human experimenters to recognize relevant behaviors. Second, non-human species are non-
verbal, with the dual implications that we cannot ask them about their motivations for their 
behavior, nor can we ask them about outcomes that did not result in an overt change in their 
behavior. Thus, we will miss any response that does not have a behavioral manifestation. As a 
result, experiments focus on whether other species act in a certain way, not whether they 
mean to act in that way. Finally, the limitation to measuring behavioral changes means that the 
methods utilized in humans typically differ substantially from those used in other primates, 
which can complicate comparative analyses. 
There have been two approaches to comparative work on justice and fairness. The first 
is to adapt game theory methods to explore decision-making in other species. Game theory is a 
powerful approach that allows complex decision making to be modeled experimentally as a 
series of carefully controlled choices, which can be experimentally manipulated to rigorously 
explore the behavior of interest (16). The advantage of game theory for comparative research is 
the focus on very simple choices to uncover complex behavior, making these techniques 
amenable to use in a wide variety of other species. Procedures can be designed that require no 
verbal instruction whatsoever and that can be used in the same form in humans and other 
species, allowing for direct comparisons and subsequent explorations of shared outcomes or 
cognitive mechanisms (17). While we cannot assume that different species (or different 
individuals within the same species) interpret identical procedures in the same way, if 
procedures differ between species then we are never able to disentangle whether any resulting 
differences in behavior are due to species differences or differences in the procedure. One 
challenge to experimental approaches is that humans interact with an experimenter of the 
same species, while other species interact with an experimenter of a different species (a 
human). While this is a practical necessity, other species did not evolve to interact with 
humans, and so careful controls are needed to determine that the non-human subjects were 
evaluating their outcomes relative to their conspecific partner, not the experimenter. 
Additionally, experimental approaches are artificial, and so we may miss situations in which 
justice-related behavior occurs. Despite these drawbacks, game theoretic approaches have the 
advantage of being comparable to the human literature and so are indispensable for 
comparative research.  
A second approach is to explore behaviors that may be related to justice and fairness in 
species-specific contexts. This includes observational studies, in which behavior is observed 
during unconstrained interactions. This approach has the advantage of being the most natural, 
which leads to likely candidate behaviors and a better understanding of how justice or fairness 
manifest in the species’ typical interactions. Moreover, as these studies are not reliant on 
manipulating outcomes and measuring subjects’ subsequent behavior, there is the opportunity 
to study justice outside of the context of food distributions. The disadvantages are that these 
results are less comparable across species, particularly if methods or the contexts in which 
individuals are attentive to inequity differ, and the underlying motivations for subjects’ 
behavior are not known. The ideal is to combine insights from both approaches. 
 
3. Using game theory to explore justice-related behavior 
3.1 The Ultimatum Game 
In 1982, Werner Guth presented the Ultimatum Game (UG), designed to explore 
fairness in bargaining behavior in humans (18; see Figure 1). In this game, one individual, a 
proposer, is given a set sum and told to allocate it between him or herself and a partner. If the 
partner, called the responder, accepts the allocation, both parties receive the money as 
allocated, but if the responder rejects it, neither party receives anything. Hundreds of 
experiments across the last three decades have shown that modern Western humans typically 
allocate about 40% of the sum to the responder, and responders typically reject anything under 
about 20% of the allocation (19). Allocations are higher than those seen in a related game, the 
Dictator Game (DG; Figure 2), in which the responder has no recourse to the proposer’s 
allocation, indicating that the proposer alters his or her allocations dependent upon whether 
the responder can influence the outcome.  
The UG is often considered to measure fairness preferences, thus it is particularly 
relevant to considerations of fairness and justice in other species. There have been two studies 
in chimpanzees, both relying on a limited-form version of the game, in which proposers make a 
choice from between two pre-set distributions (Figure 3). In neither case did chimpanzee 
responders refuse allocations, however proposers’ behavior differed between the studies. In 
the first, proposers chose between the two trays, each of which contained foods for them and 
their partner (neither chimpanzee could reach their partner’s food). After the proposer chose 
one option, by pulling the corresponding tray within reach of the responder, the responder 
could choose whether or not to accept the offer by pulling the tray in such a way that both the 
proposer and the responder could access their rewards. In this study, proposers consistently 
chose the larger outcome for themselves and responders accepted virtually any offer (20). 
However, responders accepted more than half of zero offers (e.g., they received nothing 
themselves), indicating that they may not have understood the task. A subsequent study 
showed that human responders rarely refused in a similar situation (21), indicating that the 
deviation from behavior typically seen in the UG could have been due to the experimental 
design.  
In a  more recent study (22), subjects were trained that one token represented an equal 
3/3 split of six food items while the other represented a 5/1 split of the foods in favor of the 
proposer. Proposers could choose a token and pass it to the responder, who could then trade it 
out to the experimenter (accepting the proposal) or not (refusing it). Proposers’ choices in the 
UG were compared to those in a DG-like condition in which the responder was present, but had 
no recourse (proposers passed the chosen token directly to the experimenter). The procedure 
was repeated using children paired with another familiar individual from their daycare class to 
ensure that humans would respond similarly to chimpanzees in this procedure.  
Despite responders never refusing offers, all chimpanzee proposers’ choices shifted 
from preferring the more beneficial 5/1 token in the DG-like condition to preferring the equal 
3/3 split in the UG. Validating the procedure, children responded in the same way. These results 
differ from typical UG results because neither the children nor the chimpanzees ever refused 
the low offer. However, in typical human UGs, responders are interacting with anonymous 
partners, and their only recourse is to refuse the offer. In this study, responders were 
interacting with individuals from their social group and had options besides refusal, such as 
punishment or the threat of punishment, which are less costly means of protest than refusing a 
positive, if relatively smaller, outcome (23). Similarly, in typical UGs, proposers’ refusals 
decrease when they are given other options (e.g., the responder can write a note to the 
proposer; 24). These results do not necessarily mean that the chimpanzees showed a sense of 
fairness, as if this were this the case, they should have preferred the equal token in both the DG 
and the UG conditions. This also does not mean that proposers had prosocial motivations, as 
they may have changed their preference to avoid refusals by the responder. Nonetheless, both 
humans and chimpanzees were apparently sensitive to how their choices influenced their 
partner’s decisions, and changed their behavior accordingly.  
  
3.2 The Impunity Game 
Closely related to the UG is the Impunity Game (IG; Figure 4). The IG is similar to the UG, 
but if the responder refuses the proposer’s offer, the responder gets nothing while the 
proposer receives their portion of the allocation as indicated by the proposer (25). This game 
has received very little attention in the human literature, in part due to the assumption that no 
rational responder would ever refuse an offer, as this action leaves them with both absolutely 
and relatively less than the proposer (in the UG, a refusal leaves the responder with absolutely 
less, but relatively the same as, the proposer). Nonetheless in a study that used the same 
procedure for both games, human subjects refused in the IG about half as often as in the UG for 
a given distribution (26).  
Much as in the UG, the challenge of the IG with primates is assuring that the responders 
understand that their choice was constrained by the actions of the proposer. Most studies of 
primates to date have explored only responses to unequal distributions, to learn how 
individuals respond to inequity when they cannot alter their partner’s outcomes (reviewed in 
27). In a typical experiment, paired subjects alternate completing a task (such as exchanging a 
token) with a human experimenter. The experimenter rewards subjects with the same rewards 
(Equity condition) or gives one a more preferred reward (Inequity condition). To rule out the 
possibility of contrast effects (28, 29), in which subjects compare their outcomes to those 
present in the environment without attending to the social component, pairs are given a 
Contrast condition in which both partners are shown the preferred reward but, after 
completing the task, receive the less preferred one (30, 31). These responses are referred to as 
Inequity and Equity rather than Inequality and Equality because, despite the fact that the 
outcomes are identical (or not), we cannot know if they are perceived identically by subjects 
due to differences in rank, hunger level, etc. 
 Initial studies confirmed that both capuchin monkeys (8, 32, 33) and chimpanzees (9, 
31) were more likely to refuse to complete the interaction (e.g., return the token or accept the 
subsequent food reward) in the Inequity condition as compared to either the Equity condition 
or the Contrast condition, although there was variation within and between studies (discussed 
below in more detail; 9, 34, 35). Since humans refuse more frequently in situations in which 
they do not like the outcome (e.g., in the UG game), this similar behavior in other species has 
been interpreted as responding negatively to inequitable outcomes. The response is also 
sensitive to context, with refusals occurring only after subjects have completed a task, but not 
when rewards are simply handed out for “free” (29, 35-38). Despite this, subjects do not 
change their rate of refusal when they have to work harder than a partner to achieve their 
reward (39, but see 40 for an exception). This indicates that while subjects are sensitive to 
inequity in the context of joint action, it is the difference in outcome rather than effort that is 
important for their decision-making. This may indicate that subjects are more sensitive to 
distributional inequities than procedural ones. 
 Demographic variables also influence individuals’ responses, but not always in 
consistent ways. For instance, not all studies show a dominance effect, although for those that 
do, dominant individuals always respond more strongly than do subordinates, presumably 
because they are more accustomed to receiving higher-valued rewards (31, 34). There are also 
no consistent sex differences (9, 31), possibly due to relatively small sample sizes (although 
several dozen chimpanzees have been tested across three facilities, a large sample for captive 
primate studies, this is a very small sample size for untangling individual variation). The degree 
to which individual differences influence behavior – both in non-human and human primates – 
is a topic that requires additional exploration. 
 Finally, not all primate species refuse in conditions of inequity. The same procedure to 
elicit inequity has now been used to test seven primate species, and similar procedures have 
been used with several others (see Table 1). Comparing these different species’ responses 
allows us to consider which social or environmental factors may have played a role in shaping 
the evolution of the response. While more species will need to be tested to verify these 
conclusions, patterns are emerging. For instance, responding negatively to inequity is not a 
homology within the primates. Among the great apes, bonobos may respond similarly to 
chimpanzees and humans, indicating that the last common ancestor of Pan and Homo shared 
this behavior. Only five bonobos have been tested, making statistical analyses difficult, however 
their refusal rates doubled from 10% to 20% in the Inequity as compared to the Equity 
condition (34). On the other hand, orangutans showed no response to inequity (34, 41), 
eliminating the possibility of a homology within the great apes. Additionally, the behavior is not 
a homology within the New World monkeys, as of the five New World monkeys tested, only 
capuchins responded differently to the inequity condition. The orangutan’s behavior also rules 
out the possibility that this is related to increased brain size or advanced cognitive capabilities, 
as orangutans have a similar brain-to-body ratio and cognitive skills as the other great apes. 
 Thus far, negative responding to inequity correlates positively with whether a species 
cooperates routinely with non-kin (reviewed in 10; see Figure 5). Chimpanzees, bonobos and 
capuchin monkeys cooperate with non-kin, for instance in coalitions and alliances, and all three 
species responded to inequity in these experiments. Macaques, too, both responded negatively 
to inequity (42, 43) and show cooperation in the form of coalitions and alliances (44). However 
in squirrel monkeys, a species confamilial (and sympatric) with capuchins, but lacking extensive 
social cooperation, males responded more strongly to the Contrast condition than either the 
Inequity or Equity conditions, indicating that their reactions were more strongly influenced by 
their previous offers than by those received by another monkey (30). Again considering 
orangutans, one way in which they differ from chimpanzees and bonobos is their relative lack 
of social cooperation. A potential difficulty arises with the species that show bi-parental care. 
These species cooperate extensively, working together to raise offspring, but none of the 
species tested in this paradigm thus far have shown evidence of responding to inequity (37, 45). 
However the proposed function of responding to inequity is to judge the value of cooperative 
partners in order to determine whether to search for a new partner. It is very costly to find a 
new pair mate, so it is possible that even if individuals in bi-parental care species do notice 
inequities, they have evolved to respond only to large inequities, which does not include 
receiving a less preferred reward than their mated partner.  
Related to this, subjects should be more sensitive to inequity when forming a 
relationship, which is a time when the costs of finding a new partner are less, than after the 
relationship is established and there is joint investment in offspring (10). One drawback to our 
understanding of human behavior is that most studies to date have involved unrelated 
individuals, mostly strangers, virtually always in conditions of anonymity, and often without 
repeated interactions, which removes the possibility of reputations forming. While these 
conditions are informative for exploring the degree to which humans will cooperate without 
either a relationship or social knowledge, this is not as informative for telling us about typical 
human cooperative behaviors, which primarily take place within established relationships with 
known partners. Additional experiments that explore differences in behavior in the context of 
different social relationships and with different degrees of anonymity will be essential to 
understand how inequity functions in the context of the relationship.  
 
3.3 Prosocial Games 
 Despite children’s calls of “that’s not fair” when they receive a less preferred outcome 
than another child, responding negatively to receiving less than one’s partner is only one part of 
a sense of fairness. A sense of fairness or justice requires responding not only to inequities that 
affect oneself, but also to those that affect others (14, 46, 47). This has been explored most 
commonly using procedures reminiscent of the Dictator Game. In the typical experimental 
game with primates, the subject has the option to provide rewards, or not, to a social partner. 
Importantly, the subject’s behavior with a social partner is compared to their behavior when 
alone, ruling out the possibility that they are choosing the prosocial option because there are a 
greater number of rewards visible than in the non-prosocial option. The critical difference 
between these games and the DG is that choosing to reward the partner does not reduce the 
subject’s own payoffs in these prosocial games, thus there are no disincentives for prosocial 
behavior. 
 Although reward structures have varied across experiments, making direct comparisons 
difficult, a sufficient number of these studies exist that patterns are emerging. Chimpanzees 
choose to bring rewards to their partners in some experiments (48), but not others (49, 50), 
and it is not yet clear which features lead to prosocial behavior in this ape. It is also not clear 
that these results are reflective of chimpanzees’ prosocial tendencies. Results in the inequity 
studies described above imply that chimpanzees may recognize when they receive a better 
outcome than a partner even when they chose not to act to change the situation. In these 
studies, subjects sometimes refused preferred rewards when their partners got less preferred 
ones, and did so at greater rates than when both received preferred rewards (31). This does not 
mean that the subject’s motivations were prosocial, as they may have feared the partner’s 
reaction to receiving a less preferred reward than the subject, but these results verify that 
chimpanzees recognized when they received better outcomes than a partner.  
Among the monkeys, capuchin monkeys preferentially chose the prosocial option (51, 
52), and were more likely to reward kin than either non-kin group mates or non-group mates 
(51). Callithrichids, one of the taxa that show bi-parental care, also chose the prosocial option 
that rewarded a group mate (53, 54), although like the chimpanzees, they did not do so in all 
experiments (55, 56). Finally, long-tailed macaques also showed prosocial behavior, but in this 
study dominants chose the prosocial option while subordinates did not (57). Again, these 
studies measured behavior, not motivations, so they cannot shed light on why the monkeys 
behaved prosocially (e.g., they cannot disentangle whether subjects were prosocially motivated 
to help their partners or were selfishly motivated to avoid repercussions for not helping their 
partners).  Nonetheless, while there is still debate about the contexts under which each of 
these species show prosocial behavior and the selective pressures underpinning it, in some 
circumstances all of the primates tested thus far actively chose an outcome that benefitted a 
partner as well as themselves.  
 
4. Species specific approaches to justice and fairness 
4.1. Inequity in the context of cooperation 
 If responding to inequity is a mechanism for identifying good cooperative partners, then 
inequity should influence behavior when cooperation is required. This can be experimentally 
explored by introducing inequity into an experimental cooperation paradigm. Capuchin 
monkeys have been studied extensively in the realm of cooperation and there is evidence that 
they understand the contingencies of cooperative tasks and are sensitive to their partner’s 
behavior (reviewed in 58). In the first study to explore cooperation in a situation of inequity, 
capuchin monkeys could work together to pull in a heavy tray to obtain food, but only one 
monkey got the food. Monkeys worked together, but only if the individual who received the 
food shared with the individual who did not. Perhaps anticipating this, the monkey who got the 
food was more likely to share in this condition than in a control condition in which they could 
acquire the food without their partner’s help. This indicates a sensitivity to their partner’s 
reaction and an anticipation of their need for their partner’s help  (12).  
 In a study more explicitly exploring inequity and cooperation, monkeys were tested in a 
similar paradigm in which both monkeys always received food, but these foods differed in the 
degree to which the monkeys preferred them. Thus, sometimes both monkeys received the 
(same) preferred food, sometimes they received the (same) less preferred food, and sometimes 
one received the preferred food while the other received the less preferred food. The monkeys 
were not separated nor were their roles pre-determined by the experimenter, so in all cases, 
the monkeys had to negotiate between themselves who would pull from which location, which 
also determined who got which food item. The pair’s pulling success was not dependent upon 
the value of the rewards; pairs pulled in the tray just as often for two identical rewards as for 
two different ones. Instead, the monkeys were sensitive to their partner’s behavior. In some 
partnerships, individuals shared access to the more preferred reward when the rewards 
differed, each receiving it approximately half of the time. In these partnerships, cooperative 
pulling success was high (approximately 70%) in all three conditions. On the other hand, for 
partnerships in which one member dominated the preferred reward in the different-reward 
condition, they succeeded in pulling in the tray only about 30% of the time across all three 
conditions (11).  
. These results show two important things. First, subjects in the inequitable partnerships 
apparently reacted against their partner, not the reward distribution. That is, when one 
member dominated the preferred reward in the different-reward condition, pulling rates 
dropped across all conditions, even the two conditions in which both monkeys got the same 
reward. This supports the hypothesis that recognizing inequity helps to identify cooperative 
partnerships, as these subjects refused to work with a specific partner rather than refusing a 
certain outcome. Second, in the partnerships in which neither individual dominated the 
preferred rewards, subjects were, by definition, receiving the less preferred reward on half of 
all different-reward trials, yet cooperation was maintained. The reality of cooperation is that it 
is unlikely that every individual will receive the same reward on every trial, and these results 
indicate that capuchins are somehow able to extrapolate across multiple trials and therefore 
reap the gains of cooperation despite variation in outcome. 
 
4.2  Inequity in interactions with the experimenter 
 While the above data relate to primates’ rewards in comparison with each other, how 
do primates react towards the experimenter who caused the inequity? A recent study explored 
which of two novel experimenters the monkeys preferred to interact with in a task in which the 
monkey returned a token to an experimenter in order to get a food reward. Subjects first 
gained experience with both experimenters, one of whom consistently provided the offered 
rewards and one of whom failed to provide the offered reward (or any reward) on up to 50% of 
trials. When the monkeys then had free choice as to which experimenter they would return the 
token to, subjects were equally likely to interact with both experimenters (59). While it may be 
that capuchin monkeys do not form preferences for experimenters based on reliability (they do 
show preferences between experimenters in other situations; 60), it is also possible that the 
relationship between humans and captive non-human primates influenced the results. Despite 
the fact that subjects in (59) had never interacted with the experimenters who participated in 
the study, they did have extensive experience with experimenters in general, as well as with 
trials in which rewards were not given (e.g., because of incorrect responses). Thus they may 
have responded to this situation by trying to “correct” their response rather than recognizing 
the experimenter’s unreliability. Pet dogs, who may have a different relationship with humans, 
do discriminate between human experimenters in a similar task (61).  
 
4.3 Inequity in social interactions  
Some of the best evidence in favor of a sense of justice or a sense of fairness comes 
from observational studies of non-human primates’ interactions during their natural behavior. 
These interactions also offer the opportunity to look beyond distributional equity. 
Unfortunately in many cases these events are extremely rare, making it difficult to make strong 
statements about these behaviors. Moreover, observational work yields correlations, which 
cannot tell us causation without controlled studies that alter one variable at a time. 
Nonetheless, these situations may be the best window we have into primates’ sense of fairness 
and justice as they are natural interactions, unconstrained by human behavior or experimental 
contingencies.  
Chimpanzees display a sense of “social regularity” that has been linked to the human 
sense of justice (6). Chimpanzees appear to have expectations about others’ behavior, and are 
known to express frustration, sometimes aggressively, when these expectations are violated. 
Moreover, such responses are not limited to the apes. Apes and monkeys both engage in 
policing behavior in which individuals, typically the highest-ranking males, intervene in fights to 
maintain group stability. Some of the best evidence for the utility of policing behavior comes 
from studies done with macaques. In these studies, the groups’ behavior was compared on 
typical days and those in which the highest ranking males were removed. Results demonstrated 
the males’ necessity in stabilizing the group’s interactions (62, 63). Similarly, both macaque and 
chimpanzee males, once they have established high status, will intervene in fights on the side of 
the loser (64, 65). While there are many reasons for such behavior, it again indicates that these 
males recognized social inequalities in others’ interactions and were willing to act against their 
own short-term self interest to rectify them. Of course, in the longer term, maintaining group 
stability always benefits a high-ranking male, and a physical intervention may additionally 
emphasize his power to others in his group. Nonetheless, there are short term costs to entering 
into any fight, particularly in favor of an individual who is losing.  
Recently, inequity has also been linked with play fighting in gorillas. Gorillas who gained 
the upper hand during a bout of play fighting worked to maintain it, possibly indicating that 
they were aware of the social dynamics and strove to maintain their competitive advantage 
(66). The authors emphasized the benefit of studying inequity in a natural social context, and 
considered how responses to inequities may vary depending on whether the individual in 
question has the social advantage. Again, for practical experimental reasons, much work 
focuses on inequity of food rewards, but attention to inequity may have evolved in the social 
realm, and only more recently adapted to physical outcomes, such as food. Future work will 
help to determine how responses to inequity vary depending upon the commodity in question. 
 
5. Inequity and related behaviors 
 Inequity likely interacts with other behaviors, although thus far there have been few 
studies to explore these interactions. Below I briefly consider a few potential areas of interest.  
 
5.1 Punishment 
Recognizing inequity is only one of several behaviors that likely underpin cooperation. 
Punishment may also support cooperation. Cleaner fish, who cooperate with non-kin during the 
cleaning interaction, do not respond to inequity of rewards as compared to a social partner 
(67). However, the fish do punish one another for acting against the pair’s interests (68). Thus, 
it may be that in species or situations in which finding a new partner would be difficult or 
costly, punishment to change the current partner’s behavior is used in lieu of finding a new 
partner (69).  
 
5.2 Inequity and contrast effects 
 It seems likely that responses to inequity share cognitive mechanisms with behaviors 
such as loss aversion and contrast effects, both of which involve reactions to unexpectedly 
lesser outcomes. These are rather difficult to untangle experimentally given that inequity is 
essentially a contrast effect with the others’ outcome as the referent (similarly inequity is a loss 
with the other’s outcome as the referent). However, we can compare the relative strengths of 
these motivations using well-designed experiments. For instance, while some species (e.g. 
chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys) were more sensitive to inequity with one’s partner than 
to contrast with previously offered outcomes, others (e.g. squirrel monkeys) showed the 
reverse. Mapping such preferences may help to determine the underlying influences on the 
expression of these behaviors, providing insight into the relative strength of social and non-
social environmental stimuli on a species’ decision making. 
  
5.3 Inequity and delay of gratification 
In order for an animal to refuse a reward as a means of displaying displeasure, they 
must be able to delay gratification (70). Turning down an immediate food reward is not 
something that most individuals will easily do, even for a potentially greater payoff in the 
future. However, if the hypothesis that individuals’ tendency to do so is related to cooperation 
is correct, then a negative response to inequity may involve expectations about what an 
individual will, should, or could receive in the near future. This is similar to delay of 
gratification, albeit with a far less certain future outcome, suggesting that the act of refusing 
may be scaffolded by the individual’s ability to delay gratification. Of course, the animals need 
not understand this logic, but this may be an underlying mechanism of responding to inequity, 
or a frequent need to respond to inequity may provide selective pressure to improve a species’ 
ability to delay gratification. Supporting this link, several primate species that respond 
negatively to inequity are able to delay gratification for comparatively long periods of time (71-
73). It will be interesting to see how this and other cognitive mechanisms influence individuals’ 
ability to respond to inequity. 
 
6. Future Directions and Conclusions 
 Although in the previous decade we have learned much about non-human primates’ 
responses to inequity, there remains much to learn. First and foremost, humans are primates, 
which makes non-human primates a natural group for comparison, yet other species also 
respond to inequity (61, 67, 74, 75). More work is needed to identify which species respond to 
inequity, whether these responses are similar across species, and the nature of individual 
differences in response in these species. This will also provide a stronger test of the hypothesis 
that inequity responses correlate with cooperation.  
Another important area of inquiry is distinguishing situations in which non-human 
species notice versus respond to inequity. All of the studies described above focus on 
behavioral responses to differing outcomes, but subjects may notice an inequitable situation 
that they do not to respond to, for instance because they are unable to inhibit their desire for 
the reward, because of social pressure, or for other reasons not yet known. One way to address 
this question is to explore changes in individual’s affect across different conditions to identify 
responses that occur in the absence of a behavioral response. This approach has been 
successful in identifying recognition of inequity in young children (76).  
Inequity also occurs in a variety of contexts that are not yet reflected in the non-human 
literature due to the focus on distributional concerns in experimental tests. One major focus of 
human research that has received little attention in the non-human literature is procedural 
inequity (77). Although preliminary investigations reveal no change in subjects’ behavior based 
on procedural variations (31), non-human primates have expectations about others’ behaviors 
and it is reasonable to assume that they are sensitive to procedural differences.  
One limitation of the existing experimental research related to justice and fairness is 
that it typically involves interactions between non-human primates and human experimenters. 
Although the comparisons that the primates make are typically with a conspecific, the 
experimenter mediates the interaction and determines the rewards. It is possible to design 
experiments that largely remove the human presence (e.g., 11), and future work in this 
direction would be informative. 
All of the experimental work to date has involved an egocentric approach to fairness 
and justice, yet observational studies of natural behavior indicate that primates will intervene 
in the interactions of others, in some cases impartially. Although challenging, it is possible to 
study fairness in the lab removed from egocentric reactions. Experimental studies on 
reputation in chimpanzees indicates that these apes are able to form opinions about human 
experimenters from watching these experimenters interact with other chimpanzees (78, 79). A 
fruitful line of inquiry would be to explore non-human primates’ judgments of the equity of 
others’ interactions. Such third-party assessments of others’ distributions would be the first 
research to experimentally examine justice in other species. 
Finally, studies of justice and fairness will advance significantly when work from the lab 
is combined with what we know about animals’ natural behaviors in the wild (80). In this way 
we will better understand the social and ecological conditions under which these preferences 
manifest, which lends additional insight into their function. 
 Humans are not alone in responding negatively to differential treatment as compared to 
a partner. This response is shared with other species, and appears to be instrumental in 
successful cooperation. Understanding the evolution of this response provides insight into our 
own behavior. While non-human primates do not show a sense of justice or fairness in the 
same way as humans do, gaining knowledge about the evolution of justice and fairness from 
comparative studies will improve our understanding of these judgments in humans as well.  
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1: A schematic diagram of the Ultimatum Game (UG). 
 
Figure 2: A schematic diagram of the Dictator Game (DG). 
 
Figure 3: A schematic diagram of the limited form UG; in this version, the proposer can choose 
between two options. 
 
Figure 4: A schematic of the Impunity Game (IG).  The full IG has not yet been explored with 
other species, however a typical inequity procedure is reminiscent of the Responder’s choice in 
the IG (indicated by the dotted line). That is, the Responder must choose whether or not to 
accept a distribution, but their choice does not influence their partner’s outcome (in the typical 
experiment, the human experimenter functions as the Proposer, so the Responder’s partner is 
not responsible for the outcomes). 
 
Figure 5: A schematic diagram indicating the responses to inequity of subjects that have been 
tested using the typical inequity procedure in which subjects exchange tokens for rewards while 
sitting next to a partner. Note that this diagram excludes gorillas, for whom too little 
information is known. Photo of the macaque and bonobo by F.B.M. de Waal, photo of the 
orangutan by C. Talbot, photo of Darwin from the public domain, and all other photos by the 
author. 
 
 
 
 
